China futures market. by Au, Kar Oi Karen. et al.
CfflNA FUTURES MARKET 
by 
AU KAR 01, KAREN 
歐家愛 ’‘ 
WONG HAK CHI 
王克智 
1 I 
MBA PROJECT REPORT 
Presented to 
The Graduate School 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF B U S _ S S ADMINISTRATION 
TWO-YEAR MBA PROGRAMME 





















 f t 
^ ^ ^ 董E
 f
 g 
零 ！x ^ v ^ 
APPROVAL 
Name: Wong Hak Chi, Andy 
Au Kar Oi, Karen 
Degree: Master ofBusiness Administration 
Title ofProject: China Futures Market 
y^tAy^L^、丄秦‘—、 
(Name of Supervisor) 
Date Approved: ' H j 3 / ½ 
i 
ABSTRACT 
Futures market of China can be traced back to early this century. However, 
when the communist party took over China in 1949, it banned all the commodity 
market and futures exchanges. Under the planned economy, government controlled all 
the prices and there was no space for the development of futures market. 
However, when Deng Xiaoping took control and introduced the reform in 
1978, market economy emerged in China. Government began to liberalize prices and 
there was a need for produces and enterprises to hedge their price risk. Therefore, a 
demand to restore commodity market and futures market has risen. China government 
began to send delegation to examine the operation of foreign futures and commodity 
exchange in late '80s. Finally, the first agricultural commodity market was set up in 
Zhengzhou. After then, many exchanges were established. The number once totaled 
to over 40. In 1994, the government closed many small exchanges and there are 15 
exchanges in China currently. 
While developing rapidly, China futures market experienced many problems. 
Among them include excessive speculation, lack of regulations, strong government 
intervention and frequent violations against rules of trading. Basically, there is still a 
long way to go for China futures market to fully accomplish the price discovery and 
risk-shifting functions of futures market. 
The future prospects of China fixtures market depend on the further reform of 
economy. Trading volume and maturity of participants will be increased. Moreover, as 
the legislation and supervision become more standardized, speculation will be curbed 
ii 
and China futures market will accomplish the functions it should achieve and 
contribute to the economic reform and development of China. 
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Futures appeared in the headlines of newspapers all over the world in March 
last year when the old English prestigious bank Barings collapsed due to the offensive 
trading by a trader named Leeson in Singapore. For some people over the world, it 
might be astonished when they heard about that there is something named "futures" 
which can be traded and can bring a bank down. In fact, futures was no longer new to 
China. It landed in China almost a century ago. However, it vanished in the country 
for almost 40 years since communist party took over China in 1949. 
China began its economic reform in 1978 and market economy emerged 
afterwards. Restoration of futures market in China was marked by the opening of the 
Zhengzhou wholesale market in 1990. China had achieved an encouraging growth but 
also a harsh learning curve in futures market since 1990. However, large amount of 
fonds are still entering the market and trading volume increases every year。Investors 
and economists all over the world are still watching the futures market in China 
closely. Futures market is indeed another cornerstone in the Chinese market economy 
after the spot market. 
Objectives 
With the approaching of 1997 in one year. Hong Kong economy is strongly 
under the influence of China. Thus, it becomes necessary for Hong Kong people to 
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learn about about the financial market development in China, especially for those who 
are working in the finance and capital market sector. 
Given our concern and interest in any new development in the financial sector 
in China, we conducted this study to examine the futures market in China with the 
following core objectives: 
• to study the development of the China futures market 
• to examine the existing problems in the China futures market 
• to study the reasons behind the problems in the China futures market 




In order to attain the above objectives, we relied on secondary information 
including reviewing literature and articles in journals, magazines and newspapers for 
updated information about the market. We had also looked for information in 
organized work done by some financial institutions such as banks. Besides these 
market information, we also used the statistical data released by the State Statistics 
Bureau and futures exchanges. 
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CHAPTER n i 
ENVIRONMENT OF CHEVA 
Area and Population 
The People's Republic of China ("PRC") is the third largest country in the 
world in terms ofland area. As the end of 1991, the population ofthe PRC was over 
1.1 billion. It is the world's most populous country, inhabited by about one-fifth ofthe 
world's population. 
The PRC government is organized pursuant to the Constitution of the PRC 
(the "Constitution"), the most recent form of which was adopted by the National 
People's Congress (the "NPC") in December 1982. Pursuant to the Constitution, the 
NPC is the highest organ of state authority and it has final authority on all major 
matters ofstate, including the review and approval of state plans and budgets. 
The State Council is the highest administrative organ of the state. The State 
Council is responsible for the supervision and coordination of all ministries and 
commissions at the state level as well as all administrative agencies at local levels. It 
prepares and supervises the implementation of the State Plan and budget. 
Economic Overview 
In 1978, the PRC began implementing an economic reform program to increase 
the degree of liberalization from a centrally planned economy to a more market-
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oriented economy. In 1993, a "socialist market economy" was endorsed. As part of 
the economic reforms, managers of enterprises have been granted more decision-
making powers and responsibilities in relation to matters such as production, 
marketing, use of funds, and employment and disciplining of stafF. 
The PRC government is also gradually relaxing many of its controls over 
product prices. Products which are not subject to the State Plan are generally sold at 
prices determined by market conditions. 
Industrial output in the PRC has grown rapidly since 1988. The last decade of 
economic reform has resulted in a change in the PRC's industrial patterns. In recent 
years，growth in industrial output has become relatively balanced between light 
industry and heavy industry. The inflation rate in the PRC has experienced significant 
fluctuation over the last few years. Retail price increase 18.5% in 1988 brought about 
the imposition of severe austerity measures including the implementation of tight 
monetary policies by the People's Bank of China late that year. In 1990, the inflation 
rate was reduced substantially to 2.1%, the lowest since 1984, and remained low at 
2.90/0 in 1991. The decline in inflation was attributable to suppressed demand and 
tight control over prices and credit. 
For the first three months of 1993, inflation amounted to 8.6% and in urban 
areas during the same period inflation amounted to 15.0%. In 1994, the economic 
growth in the PRC accelerated, and inflation increased a lot. After the 
macroeconomics policy imposed by government after 1994, inflation began to decline 
in 1995. 
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TABLE 1: mFLATION RATE m O H N A 1978-1995 



















Source: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic ofChina. 
In the five year plan supervised by the Planning Commission call for the 
establishment of an economic structure consistent with a socialist planned economy 
based on public ownership and market regulation. In addition, emphasis is placed on 
the further opening of the PRC to the outside world by expanding economic and 
technological exchanges with other countries. The plans also seek to relieve supply 
bottle necks which have arisen from rapid growth during the 1980s and to allocate 
resources to the priority areas of agriculture, energy, transportation, 
telecommunications and basic materials industries. 
The PRC's target of 9% annual GNP growth rate in the current eighth Five-
Year Plan is somewhat higher than the average 7.78% per annum achieved in the 
previous Five-Year Plan from 1986 to 1990. In the People Congress recently held in 
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Beijing in March, the annual growth rate of real GNP was targeted at 8% and the 
inflation was targeted at below 8%. 
TABLE 2 : THE ECONOMIC TARGETS OF THE EIGHTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Average annual growth % 1986-1990 actual 1991 -1995 planned 
Real GNP TS ^ 
Industrial output 13.1 6 5 
Agricultural output 4.6 3 5 
Retail sales 3.4 10.0 
Price index 10.1 <6.0 
Average wage rate 2.5 2.0 
Consumption per capita 3.1 3.0 
Source: Hongkong Bank China Service Limited. 
Both the industrial sector and the agricultural sector are main contributors to 
China economy. Heavy industry which involves heavy uses of petroleum and metal 
ranks the first in the list. Light industry comes second while agriculture comes third. 
This may explain why futures markets are necessary in China as a stable price of the 
raw materials for the major industries is important to contribute to a good performance 
of China economy, 
TABLE 3: TOTAL OUTPUT VALUE BY SECTOR OF CfflNA ][N 1990 
Sector Share ofTotal Output Value (%) 
Heavy Industry 32 






Source: SBCI Finance Asia Limited. China Stock Market Overview. January 1992 P 
12 ‘ , 
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National Resources and Energy Production 
Although the PRC is rich in natural resources, its overburdened transportation 
network has not been able to provide efficient delivery of its natural resources. 
According to the PRC's current Five-Year Plan, attempts are being made to overcome 
this difficulty by improving infrastructure as well as increasing the output of natural 
resources. The main energy source used by the PRC is coal. In 1992, production of 
coal reached 1.11 billion tons, making the PRC one of the world's largest producers of 
coal. The output of crude oil is expected to reach 145 million tons in 1995. In 
addition, hydro-electric power is expected to be developed as an important energy 
source. 
Foreign Investment 
Since 1978, the number of foreign investment enterprises has increased rapidly 
in the PRC. By the end of 1993, about 184,000 foreign investment enterprises with an 
aggregate amount of contracted investment of about US$ 210 billion had been 
established. Since 1978, the PRC government gas afforded greater flexibility to 
foreign parties in relation to the industries in which investments may be made, access 
to domestic markets, management of foreign investment enterprises, including greater 
attitude in hiring and dismissal of employees, in setting levels of wages, bonuses and 
allowances, and in purchasing raw materials and marketing products. 
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Legal Svstem 
The PRC is still in the process of developing a comprehensive system of laws, 
and a significant number of laws and regulations dealing, in particular, with economic 
matters and foreign investment, protection of intellectual property, taxation technology 
transfer and trade have been promulgated since 1978 when the PRC first embarked on 
its economic reform policy. The constitution was amended in December 1982 to 
authorize foreign investment and to guarantee the "lawful rights and interest" of 
foreign investors in the PRC. The legal system in the PRC is based on written statutes 
and decided cases do not constitute binding precedents, although such cases are 
sometimes referred to for guidance. 
All foreign individual, enterprises and other entities are give the same rights and 
obligations as PRC individuals, enterprises and other entities in instituting or defending 
proceedings in courts. If, however, the rights and obligations of PRC individuals, 
enterprise or other entities to institute defend legal proceedings are subject to any 
restriction in any foreign jurisdiction, then reciprocal restrictions may be imposed by 
PRC courts on the rights and obligations of the individuals, enterprises and other 
entities of such jurisdictions to institute or defend legal proceedings in the PRC. All 
foreign individuals, enterprises and other entities who wish to retain legal counsel in 
instituting or defending any proceedings in a PRC court must retain lawyers qualified 
in the PRC. 
The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
("CffiTAC"), established in Beijing under the auspices of the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade, is one of two domestic arbitration organization in 
the PRC charged with arbitrating foreign-related disputes. CffiTAC's arbitration rules 
10 
provide that CEETAC has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from "international 
economic and trade transactions" with respect to which an arbitration agreement 
selecting CIETAC arbitration has been reached. Another arbitration organization 
exclusively arbitrates foreign-related maritime disputes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BACKGROUND EVFORMATION OF FUTURES MARKET 
History ofFutures Market in the World^ 
Many exchanges in the world trade futures contracts. Following are some 
major exchanges in the world -- North America: the Chicago Board of Trade, the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange (CRCE), the 
New York Futures Exchange (NYFE), the Toronto Futures Exchange (TFE); Europe: 
the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), and Asia: the 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SEVEX), Hong Kong Futures Exchange, 
and those in China. 
The development of futures markets can be traced back to the Middle Ages. 
They were originally developed to meet the needs offarmers and merchants, who were 
both exposed to the risk of price fluctuation of the grain due to the uncertain supply 
each year. They would meet together to set a price for the farmer's anticipated 
production of grain and this is actually a kind of flitures contract. The contract 
provides a way for each side to eliminate the risk it faces because of the uncertain 
fUture price of grain. 
In 1848, the first futures market was set up in the US. The Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) was established to bring farmers and merchants together. Initially, its 
‘John C. Hull, Introduction to Futures & Options Markets. Prentice Hall, 1995 
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main task was to standardize the quantities and qualities of the grains that were traded. 
Then it started to develop futures-type contract in a few years, which marked the 
beginning of futures contracts trading. 
There are two types of futures contract: commodity and financial. Commodity 
futures contracts have a commodity as the underlying asset. Financial futures market 
have a financial asset such as a bond or a portfolio of stocks e.g. the Hang Seng Index 
Futures traded in Hong Kong Futures Exchange. Not all countries trade both kinds of 
fUtures. For example, the China futures exchanges trade commodity futures only 
while the Hong Kong Futures Exchange trades financial futures. 
Functions ofFutures Market^ 
Hedging 
Futures markets were originally set up to meet the needs ofhedgers. The case 
offarmers and merchants who want to lock in an assured price for their produce is an 
example ofhedging. Futures contracts enable both sides to achieve their objectives. 
Speculating 
The futures market allows the speculator to obtain leverage. With a small 
initial outlay, he or she can take a speculative position. 
2 John C. Hull, Introduction to Futures & Options Markets, Prentice Hall, 1995 
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Arbitraging 
Arbitrage involves locking in a riskless profit by simultaneously entering into 
transactions in two or more markets. 
Structure ofFutures Market 
A futures market usually contains five components: 
1. Traders: 
They are the ones who follow the futures trading regulations to trade and can 
be divided into the three main kinds: hedgers, speculators and arbitrageur. 
2。Futures Exchange 
Futures Exchange provides place, information, communication and other 
services for its members to trade futures. An exchange is usually set up as a 
corporation whose shares are owned by its members. Only members can trade in the 
exchange. General members can trade futures of its own industry. Full members can 
trade all kinds of futures. 
3. Futures Brokerage House 
They represent their clients to trade and they accept commission. They provide 
services such as analysis, forecast, data and research information for their clients. 
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4. Futures Clearing House 
They are responsible for clearing of the futures contracts. They act as the third 
party for the traders when a trade takes place. The clearing house takes up the risk 
from the trade and they are responsible for the management of the members' security 
deposit and fund in order to keep the futures exchange work. It is responsible for 
updating the prices of the contracts for the information ofthe traders. 
5. Futures Guarantor 
It is the guarantor of the futures market members. It will pay for its members 
when they cannot fulfill their contracts. The guarantors are usually made up ofbanks 
and companies of very strong financial performance. 
15 
CHAPTER V 
REASONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA FUTURES MARKETS 
The development of the futures market in China is a by-product of the social-
economic system promulgated by Deng Xiaoping. The existing macro-economical 
environment in the international arena and the local economy are the major driving 
forces to set up a regulated market in China. 
International economic environment 
One-fifth of the world's population are in China. The purchasing power and 
production power of Chinese is enormous. Since China has set up its open-door 
policy, more and more people in the worlds would like to trade with China. This 
makes China an inseparable part in the international trading arena. 
Reasons ofthe world economy affecting the development ofthe futures market 
in China: 
1. Rapid change in the world economy 
The trend in the change of the international market place acts as a motive for 
the establishment ofthe exchange place of the commodities in China. More and more 
giant companies such as IBM depend and resource in the international market place to 
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expand their business. Due to the increasing volume of exchange between countries, 
the development ofeconomy of each country relies heavily on the international market. 
In the past, the world economy was dominated by the North America 
countries. Now, this situation has changed. Three powerful parties contribute equally 
to the world economy. The first one is the original dominator -- the North American 
region. The second one is Europe. The last one is Asia-Pacific region. We believe 
that a regulated development of the futures market in the Asia-Pacific region can help 
itselfto out-perform the other two regions in the coming decades. 
2. Trend ofthe development of futures exchange 
Exchange is a machete place where futures and commodity can be traded. 
There is a trend of development of new futures exchanges from developed countries to 
developing countries following the economic development of the world. Developed 
countries have more than 50 of these exchange centers while developing countries 
have only a few. The most representative exchange centers in the world are both in 
America: the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CBE). The former exchange center accounts for more than 90% ofthe crop's trading 
volume in US. The exchange center in Tokyo acts as the most important commodity 
trading place in Asia-pacific. In 1984, the futures commodity contracts accounts for 
more than 40% of the world commodity trading volume. Now, the products extend 
from commodities futures to financial futures. Moreover, the computerization of the 
international commodity trading place urges the establishment of a modern exchange 
center in China in order to make the local products accessible to the international 
market place. Moreover, during the last decade, there was an explosive growth in the 
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fbture exchanges in Asia and countries other than US. In 1985, U.S. futures 
exchanges accounted for 83 percent of futures trading in the entire world. In 1990, 
U.S. account for only 61%. Figure 1 shows the world market share offutures trading 
volume in 1985 and 1990. 
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3. Risk diversification 
In 1982, worldwide debt amounted to US $60 trillion and it increased to US 
$119 trillion in 5 years time. Now, 80 countries are facing the risk of bankruptcy in 
which 57 countries are nearly bankrupt. Other than this, the economic parties also 
encountered credit risk, price risk, exchange risk, etc. If an international futures 
exchange center is established in China, risk diversification can benefit the whole 
country by shifting it to other bearable parties. 
Local economic environment 
1. Free-market economy enables the development of the futures market 
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Under traditional socialism, the price of all commodities is controlled by the 
government. However, under the free-market economy introduced by Deng Xiaoping, 
some of the commodity prices are determined by the market demand and supply e.g. 
farmers are allowed to sell the remainder of their grain at the best available market 
price after selling a portion of their grain to the government at a fixed price. Price now 
reflects the demand and supply of the underlying commodity. Moreover, since the 
reform, the government increased the government purchasing price of some 
commodities from primary producers in order to boom production. The reform leads 
to an exposure to price risk. Figure 2 shows the farm and sideline products purchasing 
price indices by category of commodities from 1978 to 1994. 
FIGURE 2: FARM AND SIDELDvE PRODUCTS PURCHASING PRICE mDICES 
BY CATEGORY OF COMMODITffiS 
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Hence, the need for the development of a futures market emerged since; 
• manufactures and processors need a means to hedge the price risk 
accompanied with the liberalization of prices since government no longer 
absorb all these risks. 
• the commodity prices are determined by the market demand and supply and 
are therefore short-term and local. The futures prices can stabilize the 
long-term market expectation of commodity and reflect the underlying 
supply and demand for a commodity, both in the present and in the future. 
• the futures contact system liberalizes the control ofthe commodity prices. 
• investors can estimate the risk embedded during their investment process. 
The development of the futures contract system make people more risk-
conscious. 
• the urbanization of cities provide basic infrastructure needs for the 
development of such system because most of the trading place can only set 
up in the city where the infrastructural support is strong and effective. 
• the promulgation of legal provision by the central government recently 
provide basic rules and foundations for fair trading. 
2. Financial reform stimulates the development ofthe futures market. 
The financial market has taken a great leap in the recent years. Up to 1992, 
short-term capital market raising activities amounts to RMB 50 trillion. Long-term 
financing, including all securities amounts to RMB 20 trillion. The continuous reform 
20 
in the financial market, as promulgated by the central government aids in the creation 
of a sound financial background to the development ofthe market. 
21 
CHAPTER VI 
CHARACTERJ[STICS OF THE MARKET 
In order to create a sound system for the futures market, the authority had 
studied the characteristics of the futures market worldwide and found out the right 
system for the local environment. 
The existing China futures market and their international counterparties have 
the following similarities and differences: 
Contractual basis 
The futures market in China has the same contractual system as the American 
market. A party who is going to buy or sell certain futures contact is said to be bound 
by the contractual relationship with another party in the exchange center. 
Credit system 
The exchange center collects a margin from its participating members. Buyers 
in the market in turn pay a margin to the brokers. This mechanism acts as a credit 




There is also the speculative mechanism in the Chinese futures market. As a 
result, more risks are injected into the trade. However, Chinese market participants 
are generally less educated compared with those in the western countries and they are 
not familiar with futures trading. They are therefore not well aware ofthe risk-return 
relationship in the market. We would say that it still takes time for people in China to 
learn about how to handle risk of trading futures. 
Uniqueness of the Chinese market 
The exchange centers are set up by the central government. This gives 
guidelines to local government to follow. 
The provisional establishment of “ Zhengzhou commodity exchange center", 
"Shanghai ferrous metal exchange center” and “ Shenzhen metal exchange center" 
signals the establishment of more local exchange centers for more product categories. 
This includes "Shanghai petroleum exchange center", "Nagging petroleum exchange 
center”，"Zhengzhou construction material exchange center" and "Hainan agricultural 
products exchange center" 
23 
CHAPTER Vn 
THE ZHENGZHOU EXPERIENCE IN THE EARLY DAYS' 
The opening of the wholesale grain market was another important step in 
China's economic reform. China Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain market was jointly 
established by the Ministry of Commerce and Henan provincial government. It was in 
Zhengzhou City, the capital ofHenan Province. It was formally put into operation on 
October 12, 1990 and was a standardized national grain transaction market -- the first 
of its kind in China to do business in accordance with general international rules and 
regulations. 
The Zhengzhou market was operated as a national cash forward market by the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Heinan Provincial Government. A national cash 
forward market requires negotiation over each contract terms and the contracts are 
therefore more difficult to trade. Cash forward markets are generally not very liquid 
compared with futures markets, as futures market have standardized contracts which 
make transfers between parties routine. In order to prevent default on agreements, the 
Zhengzhou market uses a performance bond (margin) which is a common mechanism 
of futures market. 
3 “China to establish Futures Market", Bejing Review. 9 December 1991 & “Stablizing Agribulture 
Prices” The China Business Review. May-June 1991. 
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The Zhengzhou market improved the distribution of food grains, thereby 
helping to reduce wheat imports. Moreover, the market helped to predict grain prices, 
providing more stability to the traditionally volatile free market. 
Grain Trading in China 
There is an increasing trend of grain trading in China. China had adopted the 
method of planned purchase and marketing of grain before economic reforms started. 
The state restored grain purchasing and marketing at negotiated price in 1983. The 
business volume of the grain market has rapidly increased year by year. In 1989, 
national grain purchases at negotiated prices exceeded the amount under state 
contracts for the first time, reaching 51.15 billion kg, which accounted for more than 
half of the total volume of grain commodities. With the deepening of the reform, the 
business volume of the grain market should expand further. 
The grain markets regulate supply and demand of grain. However, such local 
free markets cannot influence grain circulation over the whole country. Most grain 
circulation conducted between provinces in China is through contractors or vendors, 
with no stable channels or fixed local scales. The contracts are merely a letter of 
intents, which can be signed or torn up at will. Usually they negotiate to revise 
production prices, quantity and quality after a business deal is completed. The process 
resembles spot transaction. Grain circulation is actually conducted in a disorganized 
way with no stable channels or fixed locations. Price of agricultural products, 
especially grain, have fluctuated by a large margin periodically over the past several 
years. This has made it difficult both for the government to buy and for the grain 
producers to sell grain. 
25 
In 1986, China started to conduct a research together with the Chicago Board 
of Trade on the establishment of farm-product futures market. The experiment lasted 
for three years and the conclusion was that although futures market possesses function 
to avoid price risk, it is not yet time for China to set up a futures market as the 
conditions there are still not ready. However, in September 1989, eight departments 
under the China State Council presented the Report on Trail Establishment of 
Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain Market. 
Operation 
Zhengzhou market formally started to operate on October 12, 1990. The state 
provides many preferential terms to support the market. For example, the state 
decontrolled price to allow transactions to proceed as the market changes. It also 
decontrolled variety of grain in the market. Transportation for Zhengzhou Market 
grain and oil was given priority to use the railroad. Grain of Henan provinces grain 
enterprises was exempted from service charges, business tax and contract stamp duties. 
All these benefits are for attracting more tenders to the market. 
Results 
The achievements of the Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain market in the beginning 
was better than satisfactory. The number of provinces using the market has increased 
to 20 (China has 31 provinces) and the volume ofbusiness has totaled 600,000 tones. 
26 
There was therefore an accelerated decision to move from a spot market to a futures 
market. 
The opening day in the Zhengzhou market was tremendous. However, trading 
there soon slowed, with only 50,000 tones of wheat traded in the first month. 
Although Ministry of Commerce and the Henan Provincial Government gave 
permission to 200 organizations to trade, on an average day, only 20-30 players got 
involved. The main reasons for the unsupportive attitude ofthe traders: 
1) they were still learning the trading procedures, and some were even skeptical ofthe 
market mechanism. 
2) Some traders were not interested in buying wheat as 1990 was a good year for 
wheat harvest and it had left large stock piles in many major wheat-purchasing 
cities. 
In early November 1990, the Ministry of Commerce called a meeting to discuss 
the sluggish conditions in Zhengzhou market. The group suggested using both the 
push and pull marketing strategy to increase trading in the market. For the pull 
strategy, it wants to attract more traders to trade by offering choices and favorable 
terms. It recommended that the market should carry more products for trade so that 
traders can have choices. It therefore suggested to broaden the market for 
encompassing other food grains - peanuts, peanut oil and corn. It also suggested and 
that the government should not charge traders sales tax. The Ministry of 
Transportation was requested to give priority transportation to grains traded on the 
market. For the push strategy, all authorized traders were asked to be present on the 
trading floor one week a month to encourage full participation. The exchange itself, 
also served as an active role, both marching traders and serving as an agent for 
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nonmember organizations. After these policies were implementated, grains and oils 
were traded during the second month, including 40,000 tones ofwheat. 
The market has played a positive role in pushing the development of China's 
financial market system. The role was embodied in the following ways : 
The Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain Market is China's first modern fixed 
transaction market which operates all year round. The market can provide traders 
nationwide with transaction opportunities at any time, thus expanding market scopes 
and enchancing commodity circulation. 
The Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain Market is run in accordance with state 
mandated market transaction rules and regulations. It changes from the former closed 
and secret manners into a more standardized orbit of openness and equality. This 
creating a good environment for the transaction businesses. 
The Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain Market has the effect of initiating the 
standard price for trading of grains. The provinces get the Zhengzhou market prices 
regularly through the news media and publications ofthe market. They will then take 
into account Zhengzhou market prices when they negotiate grain prices or organize 
large-scale business activities. Many grain enterprises use the Zhengzhou market price 
as a guide for production and business activities. Even some small farmers have begun 
to watch prices in order to protect their interests. They would know which price level 
is reasonable to sell to the middlemen. In this way, the Zhengzhou market price is 
beginning to guide national grain transactions. 
The Zhengzhou Wholesale Grain Market promoted the reform of the grain 
circulation system and provided a basic model for establishment of local wholesale 
grain markets. In addition to the state-level Zhengzhou Market, China has six 
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provincial-level wholesale grain and oil markets -- Heilongjiang, Jilin Jiujiang ofJiangxi 
Province, Wuhu of Anhui Province, Hubei and Weihai ofShangdong Province -- and a 
group ofprefectural and county-level grain transaction markets. 
A new buying pattern has emerged with the establishment ofthe market. The 
southern provinces: Guangdong, Guangxi, and Fujian provinces have increased trading 
in wheat and peanut. Some southern cities and provinces also use the market to 
purchase national grain and oil reserves from the China National Cereals Trade Corp. 
This new pattern is a signal that grain distribution by the State may be at least partly 
replaced by the market, since previously grain supplies were purchased directly from 
the central government. 
Some Chinese officials believe that the Zhengzhou market have helped to 
stabilize grain prices nationwide. When the market opened in October 1990, the price 
ofwheat was 0.85 RMB/kg; it rose to only 0.86 RMB/kg by the end ofDecember, and 
hovered around this price in 199L A national survey ofwheat prices conducted by the 
Ministry of Commerce December 1990 found similar price levels throughout the 
country. However, people who do not agree would say that the this stable price is a 
result of the invisible government intervention. Some other people believe that this 
may be achieved by the high selling price which is slightly above international levels. 
Problems ofthe Exchange during the first two vears 
Despite the above detailed regulations, a number of structural problems could 
hinder the Zhengzhou market's development and expansion. 
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Grain trading to a large extent remains planned by the State. This influences 
buymg mentality oftraders. Even for some organizations participating the Zhengzhou 
market, they trade according to the instructions of higher-ranking government 
organizations instead of to market prices. Although there is an open market with 
competitive prices now, many organizations do not have the incentive to obtain the 
best price possible. 
Since China's market is organized by government officials, the Zhengzhou 
market staff tend to target officials rather than endues in their efforts to expand 
business. Administrators remain the most important decision makers in China. 
Traders are still learning how to conduct business in a wholesale market. Many 
traders still prefer to use traditional methods of channeling trade through old business 
connections or partners. Thus, personal relationships sometimes dictate who trades 
with whom. 
China's open market has a high default rate: 70-80% of all cash contracts 
reportedly go into default without settlement. Authorities are uncertain how risk of 
default will affect the wholesale market though few defaults have been reported. 
Traders may have difficulty coming up with the money for initial payments due 
to tightened bank credit under the austerity program. Even though the Zhengzhou 
market has called on central and local banks to provide traders with easier access to 
more credit, significant changes are unlikely. It is very difficult to transfer funds across 
provincial lines, for example, as banks in different provinces generally lack direct 
business relationships. One of the solutions the Zhengzhou market has come up with is 
considering letting buyers use government bonds to pay margins. 
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The Zhengzhou market is granted a small amount of annual allowance from the 
central government to meet its expenses. The sum is little for purchasing equipment 
and broadening marketing efforts to attract more traders. One solution the market has 
is to approach the World bank for loans for capital construction and expansion. 
Many forces oppose the Zhengzhou market expansion for their own benefits. 
These people include local wholesale and customers away from the Zhengzhou market, 
and administrative agencies that previously had exclusive control over bulk grain 
transactions between provinces, other local markets and so on. The success of the 
Zhengzhou market has encouraged local provincial governments to open their own 
markets, who see Zhengzhou as their competitor. The Jiuiang Rice Wholesale Market 
in Jiangxi Province opened on December 8, 1990, and was quickly followed by another 
rice market in Wuhu, Anhui Province, which opened on January 15, 1991. Wuhan in 
Hebie Province, on March 6 also opened a rice market, and Jilin province opened a 
corn wholesale market in Changchun March 15. In addition, when the national 
Zhengzhou market is closed on Tuesday, Thursdays, and Saturdays, the facility 
operates as a provincial wholesale market for grains other than wheat. These forces 
continue to oppose the market's ftirther expansion. 
There is a transportation problem for grains in China. The transportation 
system is inadequate and railroads, the most convenient form of long-distance 
transport, generally give priority to fuels, metals and minerals。If Zhengzhou market 
grains would like to have priority transportation, it must make the China's 
transportation organizations view the policy as beneficial to them. 
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CHAPTER Vra 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS EV CHINA FUTURES MARKET 
1995 was a remarkable year in the history of China Futures Market. It was 
marked with cycles of rule violations, turbulent market, market suspension and 
administrative interventions from the regulatory bodies. The first chaos started with 
the bond futures scandal in February. It had a severe negative impact to the futures 
market. Series of widespread rules violations of member firms shook the bond-futures 
market and forced the regulatory bodies to impose strong intervention and 
administrative commands to the market, till the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, CSRC, shut down and ceased the trading of bond futures on May 18. 
However, Commission intervention in futures market did not come to an end. After 
the bond futures, CSRC suspended trading futures of mung beans, plywood and red 
beans. In January 1996, CSRC finally closed the trading ofanother contract, red beans 
fUtures, which was traded in Suzhou Commodity Exchange since last June. 
These series ofadministrative interventions and suspensions not only destroyed 
the confidence ofmarket participants and market liquidity, it also created an excuse for 
the ban of the futures markets in China. The argument of whether China should 
introduce futures market emerged again. 
However, China futures market survived through these threats. It even 
showed an extraordinary substantial growth in 1995. By the end of 1995, there were 
2832 members in the 15 exchanges (Table 4). They traded on behalf of 115,396 
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clients，in which 33.7% were brokerages and 66.3% were non-brokerages companies. 
The annual turnover was 9926 billion renminbi ( two-third increase from 1994 ) 
equivalent to 1.5 times of the GNP in 1995. 617 million contracts were traded. More 
than 200,000 people were employed in futures-trading related business. 
In the following chapters, we are going to discuss the existing problems ofthe 
fbtures market in China and also try to figure out the reasons behind. Finally, we will 
also discuss the prospects and directions for the development of flitures market in 
China. Before that, let's review some major events happened last year as they revealed 
the problems and led to the continuous improvement of regulations and maturity of 
futures industry. 
TABLE 4: 15 FUTURES EXCHANGES JN Cff lNA 
Exchange Recent Major Products — 
Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange green beans, wheat, corns 
Beijing Commodity Exchange green beans, plywood, copper 一 
Tianjin United Commodity Exchange red beans 
Shanghai Metals Exchange copper, aluminum, zinc 一 
Shanghai Commodity Exchange plywood, natural rubber 一 
Shanghai Cereals and Oil Exchange soybeans, corns, wheat 
Shenzhen Metals Exchange copper, aluminum 
China Commodity Futures Inc. ofHainan natural rubber, cocoa, palm oil 
Chongqing Commodity Exchange steel bars 
Chengdu United Commodity Exchange corns 
Dalian Commodity Exchange corns ‘ 
Changchun United Commodity Exchange^ corns, soybeans, plywood 
Guangdong United Commodity Exchange mung beans, long-grain polished rice 
Shenyang Commodity Exchange beer barley 
Suzhou Commodity Exchange plywood, red beans 
Source : Sing Tao Daily 10 October 1995 
^Changchun Commodity Exchange was ordered to suspend trading for 6 months in Oct 1995 
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China bond futures scandal 
Bond-futures trading started in December 1992 in Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
At the heart ofthe debacle is a single futures contract - bet on the 327 contract, a 1992 
three-year treasury bond future contract, which matured in June 1995. The contract 
has been a favorite for speculators since October 1994, when the government started 
adding an inflation-linked premium subsidy to its bonds in order to make it more 
attractive for investors. Figure 3 below summarizes the inflation rate of the past 18 
years in China. The premium subsidy was introduced to compensate three-year or 
longer-maturity bond holders for the soaring inflation which was about 24% by that 
time. The finance Ministry set the premium monthly. The increasing premium pushed 
the bond prices higher and higher and so did the bond futures. Bond futures trading 
since January 1995 has averaged around 100 billion renminbi compared with around 
100 million renminbi for the bonds themselves. 
FIGURE 3: EMFLATION E^ CffiNA 1978 - 1995 
Inflation in China 
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Source: State Statistical Bureau ofthe People's Republic ofChina. 
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With China's inflation began to decline in 1995, the main player in the scandal, 
Shanghai International Securities, Sisco, however bet the premium to shrink. What's 
tme, Beijing was on the verge of a record-high billion bond issue that Sisco apparently 
thought would sap interest in three-year issue and send its price down. Thus, Sisco 
went short on the market, selling contracts it didn't own in hopes of profiting from 
price drops. Unfortunately, Beijing announced on February 21 that it would hold two 
thirds of its huge bond issue off the market. That made existing bonds issue, not less, 
attractive, and prices promptly rose. 
Sisco was hurt further when the heavy-weight Liaoning International 
Investment switched positions two days later from short to long. Like the Ministry of 
Finance's China Economic Development Co., it bet on expectations of higher prices. 
When press suggested the premium would rise, others followed suit, bidding prices so 
high that Sisco soon found itself looking at losses estimated at 600 million renminbi. 
Trading volume ofbond futures soared to an unprecedented 854 billion renminbi, 80% 
ofit accounted for by the 1992 three-year bond. Suddenly, the futures price plunged 
to 147.5 renminbi from 152. Regulators halted and investigated: Sisco had deliberately 
driven down prices by shorting a massive 250 billion renminbi worth of bonds. That 
effort cost Sisco at least 1 billion renminbi, about four times Sisco's registered capital. 
Besides, regulators invalidated 313 billion renminbi in deals clinched during the final 
eight minutes of trading. They returned the contract's price to 151.3 renminbi and 
ordered investors to unwind outstanding positions through negotiation, not by trading. 
They suspended bond-futures trading, issued stricter regulations and launched an 
inquiry into the incident. 
35 
In fact, Sisco held a short position of around three million contracts in the bet. 
That was six times Sisco's legal position limit. On the other hand, in some ways, 
though, it was odd that Sisco should be the main target of the authorities' 
investigation. After all, Sisco was on the wrong side of the trades that day; its 
counterparts - those holding long positions - were the winners. The size of the 
inflation-linked premium was a sensitive figure. It was the most important factor 
influencing price levels on the bond future contracts. Unfortunately, it was widely 
believed that the “longs” not the shorts like Sisco, had accurate inside information on 
the interest-rate subsidy that China pays to investors to make its bonds attractive. 
Most believe these magic numbers were simply leaked to those participants who got a 
real good relationship with the important figures in the Finance Ministry. 
Cease ofRed bean futures trading in Suzhou Commodity Exchange 
Suzhou Commodity Exchange started trading ofred bean futures in June 1995. 
The new contracts showed an encouraging growth in two months. 120,000 tons ofred 
beans were gathered in the registered warehouses in Suzhou for delivery between June 
and December and the futures price dropped from over 4000 renminbi/ton and finally 
converged to the spot price of about 2800 renminbi/ton at the time of delivery month.^ 
During that period, the red bean futures showed the merit of the futures contracts, it 
benefited the spot participants and hedgers。It demonstrated the power ofrisk shifting 
and price discovery of commodity futures contracts. However, starting from 
December, the market began to spin out ofcontrol. Most ofthe 1996 contracts soared 
e.g. the April contract, HD9604, rose by 2130 renminbi/ton or 53% increase to about 
5“Suzhou red bean flitures turmoil" China Futures Weekly. 5 Februaty 1995 
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5600 renminbi/ton, nearly double of the underlying spot price, only in 19 trading days. 
On the other hand, the spot red bean storage was far less than the total open positions 
in the futures markets. By January 5, red beans storage was only about 26,750 tons 
whereas the open positions of the February 96 and April 96 contracts were 298,000 
and 449,000 lots respectively ( each lot corresponds to two tons ). Finally the CSRC 
intervened. On January 8, the CSRC ordered the Suzhou Commodity Exchange not to 
offer any more new red bean future contracts when the last one matures in August 
1996. On the other hand, market participants were forced to liquidate their positions. 
The losses were estimated to be about 800 million renminbi. 
Regulatory interventions 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission, CSRC, intervened actively in the 
market in 1995 in order to fight against the excessive speculation in the market. The 
aggressive regulatory crackdown began after the commission's current chairman, Zhou 
Daojiong, previous vice chairman of State Development Bank and State Council's 
Securities Commission, took office in April last year after the bond futures scandal, 
vowing to clean up and bring order to the futures market. 
Besides ceasing trading of too speculative commodities futures, CSRC 
illustrated its determination to curb speculation and enforce regulation by suspending 
the Changchun United Commodity Exchange on October 31 last year for six months 
for repeated violations of the lackluster exchange-management. Trading in contracts 
for March 1996 and beyond was suspended although trading in earlier contracts was 
permitted until maturity. The Changchun United Commodity Exchange irregularities 
occurred in trading of corn futures. Between April and July 1995, some exchange 
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members and grain officials made illegal profits by exaggerating the amount of corn 
reserves, which are the basis for futures trading. The commission warned that if the 
exchange failed to rectify trade after the six-month suspension it faced closure. 
Besides, there were a series of banning of trading of members either by the 
CSRC or exchanges in 1995 due to the pressure of stronger supervision and 
enforcement oflaw by the CSRC. 
• The regulators dismantled Harbin Pacific Futures Trading Services Co. and 
ordered all futures exchanges to cancel the brokerage firm's membership. 
The company has been consistently ignoring warnings from CSRC and 
trading illegally with overseas clients since China banned trading of 
overseas futures in 1994. Only authorized trading enterprises with 
international trade are allowed to trade relevant overseas futures for 
hedging purpose. 
• Shanghai Commodity Exchange ordered the Shanghai Economic 
Cooperative Co. to wind down positions in plywood futures and 
temporarily banned it from trade since it illicitly opened client accounts 
when trading the November and January plywood futures contracts 9511 
and 9611. It also failed to provide proper paperwork after conducting 
trades. 
• Shanghai Commodity Exchange punished and fined two trading companies, 
China Huatong Timber Holdings (Group) Crop, and Zhongjing Enterprise 
Co., in October for exceeding holding limits in the November plywood 
fUtures contracts 9511. China Huatong was ordered to vacate its trading 
seats after settling its existing positions. 
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• “T+r clearing system was imposed in all exchanges to replace the original 
"T+0". Under the “T+0” system, exchange members were allowed to use 
the margin and profit from offsetting the initial position to open new 
account on the same day of offsetting the old position. This facilitates 
speculation. “T+I” is a means to discourage speculation. 
Thus the China futures market came through a turbulent year. It demonstrated 
quite a lot of problems which are common in the development of any new financial 
instruments. These experiences were in fact very precious to country which want to 
develop its own futures markets. There were a lot ofreasons which contributed to the 
chaotic market performance. We are going to get into more details to study the 
problems in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER JX 
PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURES MARKET EV CHINA 
Futures markets in China exhibit problems in three main areas: 
• failure to achieve price discovery and risk-shifting function 
• too speculative market 
• frequent violation of mles by exchanges, exchange members and 
brokerages 
As we know, price discovery is an important function of the future market, 
however, after five years of experience in futures market, only few contracts 
demonstrate the price discovery of commodities in the future. Most other contracts 
exhibit a huge price volatility and the correlation between futures market and 
underlying spot market is low for some commodity futures contract. Hedging is 
another important function of futures market. However, most enterprises actively 
involved in futures exchanges in China are speculators looking for quick money. In 
fact, many state enterprises owned by China government lost a lot of money in 
speculation in futures exchanges both in China and overseas. 
Speculation plays an important role in futures markets. It is speculators to 
whom hedgers shift their risk to. Speculation increases the liquidity offutures market 
and reduces risk premium embedded in future prices paid be hedgers. As a 
consequence, it reduces the cost of hedging. The greater the amount of speculation 
and the more willing speculators are to take risks, the lower the risk premium. 
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However, what China futures markets demonstrated was excessive speculation which 
drove prices irrationally in one direction and then in other. The result is increased 
volatility and more speculation. The cycle repeated again and again till the government 
intervened. 
China futures market also demonstrated the bitter lessons of every country in 
developing a new financial instrument market - lack of supervision and frequent 
violations oflaws due to immature legislation. 
There are a number of reasons behind which contribute to the problems 
mentioned above. Some concern legislation, some concern the existing market 
structure in commodity market. In the following sections, we are going to discuss 
some major problems. 
Price Reform 
Though China began its reform policy in 1978, many important agricultural 
products and major food stocks are still under strict supervision of government. The 
government tries to manipulate commodity prices to keep them low by granting 
subsidy to major agricultural products e.g. cotton, edible oil, rice, meat. Underlying 
spot markets of some future contracts are not totally free. Besides, for these 
commodity, interest rate is not allowed to float freely. Therefore, hedging needs of 
manufacturers and some financial institutions in China are not that urgent when 
compared with those in other market economies like United States and Japan. Many 
market risks are still absorbed by government. Therefore, it demotivates enterprises 
entering futures market for hedging. Some trade futures for quick return only. They 
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in introducing new contract, they coordinate to avoid contract duplications with other 
exchanges e.g. Chicago Board ofTrade, CBOT，did not start its own foreign exchange 
fUtures contracts after the success of foreign exchange future contracts introduced by 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, CME. Instead ofthat, CBOT innovated in other areas 
and introduced the T-bond and T-notes futures contract. Finally, both contracts 
achieved remarkable trading volume and risk-shifting function. By coordinating with 
others, exchanges avoid intense competition and duplication of contracts. Table 5 
shows the major contracts traded in the main exchanges in China. 
TABLE 5: MAJOR CONTRACTS TRADED EvJ MAJ[N EXCHANGES 
Zhengzhou Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Shanghai Shenzhen Chengdu Dalian~~ Chanchun Guang Suzhou 
Metals Cotruno Metals Commo dong 
green • • 
beaiis 
plywood • “ 
red beans • “ 
議 ] L _ L _ Z I Z Z ！ : ^ ^ ~ • • • 
gQpper • « 
aluminum • “ “ 
* 
Source : Sing Tao Daily 10 October 1995 
Frequent Forced liquidation 
Forced liquidation occurs when speculators go long and buy huge amount of 
nearby contracts to bid up the price artificially. Thus, the short positions suffer as 
price soars. This is more common when the underlying commodity is short of supply 
to folfill the physical delivery in liquidation. Therefore traders of short positions are 
forced to offset their positions to order to cut the loss. In China, underlying 
commodity market of most futures contracts are small in supply e.g. the annual 
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see futures as a means for profit instead of shifting risk. Therefore, speculation by 
enterprises is common. 
FIGURE 4: GOVERNMENT SUBSK)Y TO MAJOR FOOD STOCKS 1978 - 1994 
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Source: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic ofChina. 
Shrinking and duplication of contracts 
Most of the futures contracts with large trading volume are traded 
simultaneously in many exchanges. Different exchanges lay out different membership 
fees, position limit, margin requirements, maximum price fluctuation and other trading 
procedures for the same contract. It creates unnecessary competition among 
exchanges e.g. the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission allowed plywood to be 
traded in Suzhou Commodity Exchange, Shanghai Commodity Exchange, Beijing 
Commodity Exchange, Zhengzhou Commodity and Tianjin United Commodity 
Exchange. This practice is rare in other markets. In US, exchanges are very cautious 
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production of green beans is only about 500,000 tons, however, open interest once 
reached about 300,000 lots. Future markets in China are vulnerable to market 
manipulation and forced liquidation occurs frequently. Many market participants lost. 
Exchanges 
There are 15 exchanges in China, however, there are only about 30 types of 
fUtures contracts currently trade in China. These figures are disproportionately low 
when compared with the market in US or Japan. Therefore, competition among 
exchanges are very intense. On the other hand, among the 15 exchanges, only three, 
Shanghai Commodity Exchange, Shanghai Cereals and Oil Exchange and Shanghai 
Metals Exchange, are non-profit making organization. Therefore, expanding trading 
volume is a key to survival for every exchange and in order to attract large traders, 
some exchanges provide exclusive benefits and assistance to them at the expense of 
small traders and risk management e.g. some exchanges provide special rooms, 
telecommunication facilities and staff to exercise orders of big traders. Some even 
lower the margin requirement or increase the position limit for these large traders. It 
creates pressure on the risk management and solvency of exchanges since exchanges 
are counter-parties to all market participants in all contracts. 
Besides these problems, some exchanges are controlled by members with large 
stake since all exchanges are membership organization. These large members have 
exclusive influence in trading and exchange policy. In fact it was strongly believed that 
many negotiations between short and long in offsetting ordered by the exchange are 
made at the request of large members when they lost in the turmoil. Therefore, the 
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exchanges are unable to provide a fair marketplace and enforce ethical and financial 
standards applicable to futures trading. 
Exchange Members 
Being lured by the huge profit potential of futures speculation, some exchange 
members borrow the unused position quota from others to make speculation. 
Moreover, some big traders unite and manipulate the market. Some even collude with 
government authorities to distribute fake information to the market to affect the 
futures prices. 
Market players 
Futures contracts are high risk instruments but the quality of market players in 
China is immature. Futures trading demands expertise in finance, management and 
law. However, since futures market in China is in developing stage, most participants, 
including enterprise management, traders, regulators do not fully understand the 
fbnctions and principles of futures market. Many floor traders only undergone a short-
term training in derivatives. As futures is only about six years old in China, it is still a 
brand new instrument to many enterprises. The management know little about risk 
management oftrading futures. Therefore, many market participants treat futures as a 
means to earn fast money instead ofrisk shifting. 
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Future Contracts 
Among the 29 futures contracts being traded now, only few are associated with 
a huge underlying commodity spot market. Most of the underlying commodity 
markets of futures contracts are small in supply and demand. This provides 
opportunities for forced liquidation and market manipulation by large speculators. 
Moreover, abundance of hedgers emerges only when the underlying commodity 
market is large and liquidity is high. So, many manufacturers and processors of 
relevant commodities are reluctant to trade futures. This leaves more speculators in 
the market. The current contract design and variety undermines the risk shifting and 
price discovery function of futures market. 
Brokerages 
Most ofthe brokerages companies are regional companies. Most ofthem trade 
only in one exchange. Their market information coverage is limited. Moreover, there 
is no self-regulatory watchdog like brokerage association to enhance and promote 
voluntary regulations even though there are around 450 full-time brokerages in China. 
So, brokerage service is not standardized and professional. This causes unnecessary 
competition and resource misallocation. Since competition is so intense, similar to 
exchanges, trading volume of brokerage is vital to its survival. Therefore, many 
brokerages use unfair means to attract large customers e.g. they exercise trading order 
from clients in order ofposition size of the market order instead oftime order. Some 
even lower the margin requirement for large customers. Brokerages compete on the 
basis ofunfair means and violations of rules instead ofimproving their service. These 
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unfair practices lure many large speculators and harms hedgers. It increases the risk of 
brokerages too. 
Like the traders in the exchange, many brokers only have short-term training in 
derivatives and little experience in financial markets before. Supply of securities 
market expertise from colleges cannot cope with the growth of new financial 
instruments market developed in the last few years. What's worse is that, some of 
traders are lured by huge profit and cheat customers in trading. They don't conform to 
the trading rules and professional standards. Secondly, poor internal management of 
most brokerages also lay the bed for rule-breaking and cheating. Accounting control is 
not strict enough to distinguish deals traded on behalf of customers and on behalf of 
brokerage itself. 
Hot money 
Hot money contributes to the extreme speculation in futures market too. Flood 
ofhot money washes ceaselessly from one China's immature market to another. It was 
estimated that there are about 30 billion renminbi hot money seeking for fast return.^ 
These hot money is fleeing the traditional deposits in banking system since the return is 
unattractive as the government still control the interest rate and the current rate is not 
determined by market forces. At the same time, some financial institutions bet on 
commodity futures too since the lending rate is set by the government and very low 
when compared with high expected return from futures market. This enormous 
amount of hot money has huge impact on the finance, securities and futures market. 
The attack on futures market is especially great since most associated underlying 
'"Hot money attacked futures again" Sing Tao Daily, 10 October 1995 
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commodity spot market is small. Even only 1% of hot money would turn a single 
commodity future market into casino. Unless the government allows interest rate to 
flow, funds will continue to seek refuge outside banking system. Indeed, as new 
fotures trading regulations rule circulated on October 25, 1995, speculative funds 
flooded into Shanghai's Class A stock markets. The index rose 40 points and turnover 
doubled than the previous day. 
Enterprise Reform 
Though enterprise reform began in 1978, state enterprises still play a dominant 
role in industry. The nature's way separating dumb speculators from smart ones is still 
being interfered. State enterprises in futures market are extremely speculative and 
risky as they fear of nothing e.g. in case of Sisco, unlike Barings in Singapore, it 
wasn't allowed to go bankrupt even though it lost million ofrenminbi since it is largely 
owned by Shanghai City Government. Though state enterprises account for only 18% 
in the total number of enterprises in China, they account for 69% in the assets in the 
economy. The total loss of state enterprises last year was 40.9 billion renminbi. 
Most of the state enterprises are manufacturers and producers, so after the 
price reform, they began to expose to the price risk emerged in the market. Therefore, 
the need for hedging arose and they began to participate in the futures market to lock 
in their cost. The participation of these large enterprises should benefit the 
development of futures industry in China. However, since these enterprises are still 
financially backed by the government, some began to speculate in the futures market in 
hope of getting quick money since if the management made extra profit, they would 
receive an extra bonus, if they lost, the government would absorb the loss and they 
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have no personal loss with that. Therefore, it turned out that many state enterprises 
become the largest speculators in the futures market. Speculations misallocate the 
tight capital resources allocated to state enterprises and shift the capital from 
production to betting in futures market. It increased the burden of government and 
harmed the development of the economy since most ofthem lost in the futures market. 
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CHAPTER X 
PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS EV DEVELOPMENT OF 
FUTURES MARKET EV CHINA 
After studying the existing problems in the futures market, what should the 
government do and in which direction the futures industry should head in order to 
utilize the pros of futures market and how the futures market contribute to the 
economic development in China? In this chapter we are going to make some 
comments on the development of futures industry in China. 
We think that China should work in the following four areas in order to fight 
against the existing problems in futures market and turn it into a market favorable to 
the economic development, 
• curb speculation and court more hedgers 
• strengthen market regulations and law 
• develop underlying commodity market 
• eliminate unnecessary competition 
1 • Curb speculation and court more hedgers 
The most effective way to lower the market volatility is to curb the speculators 
and court more hedgers into the market. 
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First of all, China should explore commodities future contracts with a huge 
underlying spot market e.g. rice, oil, coal. Figure 5 shows the production volume of 
rice, wheat, corn and soy bean in China from 1978 to 1994. 
FIGURE 5. MAJOR AGRICULTimAL PRODUCTION JN CED[NA 1980 - 1994 
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Since small market size lure market manipulation, China should develop 
objective criteria for listing new future contracts. Upon introducing a new contract, 
CSRC should consider the following: 
• is there a need for hedging and price discovery by a broad range of market 
participants including producers, processors and end-user 
• whether prices ofthe underlying commodity are established by free market 
forces 
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• existence of reliable and objective procedures to test the quality of 
underlying commodity 
• is there adequate transportation and storage to support expected level of 
physical delivery 
Besides designing new contracts to attract more hedgers, CSRC should create 
favorable treatment and implement favored policy to those declared themselves as 
hedgers e.g., 
• lower margin requirement 
• allow higher position limit 
• no increase ofmargin when the contract becomes nearby contract 
Of course, those "hedgers" must provide relevant proofs to the CSRC in requesting 
the favored policy. Profits gained from futures trading is not taxed under the current 
taxation policy, in order to promote hedging, China should tax those non-hedgers for 
any profits they gained from the futures speculation. 
Exchanges should also improve storage facilities to enhance physical delivery. 
More authorized warehouses should be opened for different contracts. In order to 
develop an integrated national commodity market, CSRC and exchanges should 
integrate the different liquidation system of different exchanges. Contracts of same 
commodity traded in different exchanges should be standardized. Ultimately, 
government authorized agencies or other regulatory bodies should standardize and 
made public the transportation costs between cities in order to allow physical delivery 
in cities other than the city where the exchange situates. Any transportation cost 
incurred would be paid in terms of premium from one side to the other if necessary. 
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These moves would increase the flexibility of physical delivery and attract more 
hedgers into the market. 
Government should ban state enterprises from engaging speculation and place 
strict supervisions on state enterprises trading futures. State enterprises should only 
trade futures relevant to their production and core business via those professional 
brokerages allowed by the government. Government should also ban financial 
institutions from engaging in commodities markets too since primary functions ofthese 
financial intermediaries are directing the funds from lenders into investment projects 
for development of the economy. Lastly, the exchanges should fasten the step of 
reorganization into non-profit making exchanges. 
2. Strengthen Market Regulations 
Frequent violations of exchanges and brokerages are mostly the result of loose 
market regulations and rules enforcement. CSRC should enforce exchanges carrying 
out strict rules governing futures trading in margin requirement, position limits, 
maximum price fluctuation, capital requirement etc. The People Congress should 
fasten the step in the legislation of the Futures Ordinance since, strictly speaking, 
currently, there is no nationwide law from central government governing the futures 
market and trading. Exchanges and brokerages are regulated by regulations laid by 
regional governments and administrative commands from the State Council. This 
creates confusion for exchanges and traders。The national watchdog, CSRC, should 
cooperate with the regional regulatory bodies and clarify the authority ofeach body to 
avoid duplication of regulatory efforts. CSRC should also strengthen cooperation with 
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regulatory bodies in foreign markets since they are more experienced in regulating 
futures market. 
Besides supervision from external sources, futures industry participants should 
develop its own self-regulatory bodies to promote self discipline. CSRC should speed 
up the establishment of Futures Industry Association and other associations in 
brokerages in order to standardize professional rules in trading and promote self-
discipline among brokers in the industry. Conclusively speaking, the regulation 
structure should integrate the three groups in the market, namely, 
• government - both CSRC and regional bodies supervise exchanges and 
brokers through mandated laws and administrative commands 
• exchanges - govern the self-discipline of exchange members through 
exchange rules 
• fUtures industry association - govern the self-discipline of traders through 
rules of futures trading association 
3 • Avoid Unnecessary Competition 
Intense competition is a reason for rule violations of exchanges. Some 
exchanges did not perform well in terms of trading volume. Table 6 shows the market 
weight of major exchanges in China in 1984. 
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TABLE 6. MARKET WEIGHT OF MAJOR EXCHANGES m 1994 
Exchange market weight ( % ) 
Beijing Commodity Exchange 19 
Shanghai Metals Exchange 17.7 
Shanghai Cereals and Oil Exchange 13.8 
Shenyang Commodity Exchange 1.2 
Dalian Commodity Exchange 3.1 
Suzhou Commodity Exchange 18.7 
Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 8.3 
Guangdong United Commodity Exchange 3.9 
Shenzhen Metals Exchange 4.1 
Hainan China Commodity Inc. Exchange 3.1 
Shanghai Commodity Exchange 6.6 
Changchun Commodity Exchange 0 ^ 
Source : Sing Tao Daily 26 October 1995 
Therefore, CSRC should decrease the number of exchanges by merging those 
low trading volume exchanges with other well-established exchanges and also merge 
some duplicating contracts traded in different exchanges. CSRC should also 
standardize the specifications of those fotures contracts. CSRC should review the 
existing brokerages and eliminate those without strong capital and professional staffs 
too. These moves are beneficial to the futures industry since the existing small variety 
of contracts cannot accommodate such a large amount ofbrokerages and exchanges at 
the same time. By restricting excessive competition, it provides room for those 
remaining to develop. 
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4. Develop the underlying spot market 
Futures market would perform its functions well only if the underlying 
commodity market is well developed. Therefore, China should implement its price 
reform and market reform more profoundly. Government should further decrease the 
control in commodity market and liberalize more commodities prices. This would also 




After the turmoil in 1995, we expect that the China futures market will 
experience a moderate growth in terms of trading volume in 1996. However, the 
chance for China to resume bond futures this year is low since interest rate is not 
expected to be liberalized in this year. Government will still supervise the market 
closely. However, the degree of intervention will be less severe and blunt. With the 
Futures Trading Association expected to be established later this year, self regulatory 
discipline will be encouraged. There will be a number of poorly-managed brokerages 
and exchanges leaving the market while the remaining will implement a more strict risk 
management. Moreover, investors and speculators will be more rational as they learn 
more about futures trading. The nationwide Futures Ordinance is expected to be 
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